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In any discussion of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution, the question must arise as to whom is protected in the Bill of
Rights. The government of the United States affords equal protection to all
persons subject to its jurisdiction and the Fourteenth Amendment requires
that, "[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."' The Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in
the aftermath of the Civil War out of a persistent desire that the states
defeated in war be prohibited in the Constitution from any power to
discriminate against "emancipated Negroes and their white protectors. 2

*
J.D., Arizona State University, 1975; Ph.D., Northern Arizona University,
School of Forestry, 2001. Sherry Hutt is a former Superior Court Judge in Maricopa
County, Arizona, and is president of Cultural Property Consulting, Inc. She is a co-author
of Cultural Property Law: A Practitioner's Guide to the Management, Protection and
Preservation of Heritage Resources, American Bar Association (2004). The author would
like to thank C. Timothy McKeown and David Tarler for their comments on the draft article
and Elizabeth Herrgott for her editorial review of the draft. Any errors that remain are the
sole responsibility of the author.
I.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
2.
ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON & WILLIAM M. BEANEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 381 (Prentice-Hall 4th ed. 1968) (1954).
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However, this constitutional protection was not intended to be limited to
one group of newly emancipated people. Or was it? This paper asks
whether the Equal Protection Clause applies to Native Americans and, if it
does, whether a different standard of rights applies to Native Americans
than to other people under the jurisdiction of the laws of the United States.
The totality of Indian Law in the United States is a vast and
complicated subject. This paper attempts a narrow focus to examine the
dual standard that persists with regard to the cultural property rights of
Native Americans. It is the thesis of this paper that if equal protection
under the law is indeed available to Native Americans, then "special" laws
to protect their rights would not be necessary. In a nation where equal
protection of property rights is afforded to all,3 then there should be
recognition and respect for the right to maintain the culture of a people and
the right to enforce the cultural property rights of Native Americans as a
matter of constitutional law.
This paper begins with a look at the differences in progress between
Native Americans and minority groups in achieving equal protection of the
law, both in daily life and for their property. To further examine how
Native Americans became "special," but not equal, under the law, a brief
review of the history of Indian law is necessary. This paper then focuses
on one notable Native American, Geronimo, chronicling his life and then
contrasting the ways in which the laws of the United States currently
provide equal protection for the cultural property rights of groups other
than Native Americans. Where the disparity of impact on Native American
cultural property rights cannot be explained but for a distinction based on
race, the legal culture which has persisted in allowing the
disenfranchisement of a group cannot be justified in a nation which
espouses equal protection under the law.
I.

APPLICATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE TO NATIVE
AMERICANS

In an historical perspective, the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment was enacted so that, "'[w]hatever law protects the
white man shall afford "equal" protection to the black man.' 4 Initially the
effect of the provision was thought to apply only to blacks and only to
enforce equal protection in the context of state and not federal law.5

3.
4.

5.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
MASON& BEANEY, supra note 2,at 381.

Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). These cases questioned
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However, neither limitation has been upheld. Rather the reach of Congress
under the "Civil War Amendments" has been enlarged as necessary and
proper in order to make equal protection of the law fully effective. 6 The
Civil Rights Act of 1871 assumed human liberty and human rights to be
protected by the Bill of Rights as to the federal government and the states.7
In similar fashion, if the Fourteenth Amendment is not confined to any
class or race, "[w]e do not say that no one else but the negro can share in
this protection. 8 Courts have extended the concept of equal protection to
examine patterns of disparity of impact upon different races as indicia of
impermissible discrimination. 9 The application of equal protection to "any
person" applies not only to blacks, but to Mexican aliens,' 02 Chinese
business owners," and to a jury of one's peers regardless of race. '
Equal protection of law shall not be abridged in access to
employment, 3 education,' 4 housing,' 5 eating areas in restaurants, 6 public
transportation facilities, 17 public transportation,' 8 public housing, 19 as well
as other aspects of daily life subject to regulation by federal or state law.

whether the Fourteenth Amendment gave power to the federal government to control the
entire domain of civil rights, thought to belong only to the states, and whether equal
protection of the law applied beyond discrimination against blacks.
6.
Ramirez v. Puerto Rico Fire Serv., 715 F.2d 694, 698 (1st Cir. 1983).
7.
Thompson v. New York, 487 F. Supp. 212, 226 (N.D.N.Y. 1979).
8.
The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 72.
9.
See Croker v. Boeing Co., 662 F.2d 975 (3d Cir. 1981).
10.
See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (holding equal protection applies to the
ability of aliens to be employed); Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410
(1948) (holding equal protection requires that commercial fishing permits not be denied to
anyone legally in the state, even if not a citizen).
1I.
See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (finding an equal protection
violation when business permits were refused to Chinese laundrymen under circumstances
where they were granted to others).
12.
See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (striking down a criminal
conviction where the Hispanic defendant faced a jury where all Hispanics had been
excluded from the jury panel).
13.
See Croker, 662 F.2d 975.
14.
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding separate but equal
educational facilities are not equal).
15.
See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (holding unconstitutional
designation of residential living areas by race).
16.
See Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
17.
See Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U.S. 154 (1962) (regarding equal access to waiting
rooms at bus terminals).
18.
See Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (1956), afftd, 352 U.S. 903 (1956)
(regarding equal access to interstate bus service).
19.
See Detroit Hous. Comm'n v. Lewis, 226 F.2d 1801 (1955).
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The hard won advances in human rights from the 1860s through the
1960s were primarily focused upon redress for the circumstances of
African Americans, who had been separated from their culture, brought
into this country with little or no possessions, and placed in a social
structure of slavery. Thus, the gains in civil justice did little for Native
Americans who often lived far apart from urban American life on
reservations and who did not, as a practical and legal matter, have access to
housing, medical care, schools, restaurants or other public or private
facilities. During the same century that civil rights advances were being
fought and won for African Americans, Native Americans saw their
families divided and their children sent to boarding schools, their medical
needs, housing and other services tightly controlled by the federal
government and administered separately from the rest of American society
by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). Those Native Americans who
resided on reservations or ancestral lands designated as Indian country did
not experience the economic opportunities made available to impoverished
urban areas through federal block grants administered through the states.
Indian country was regarded as separate and "special," but not equal.2 °
Despite the social gains made by other minority groups in the United
States, Native American people remained apart from mainstream society.
Although slavery was abolished by the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865, and
African Americans were guaranteed the right to vote in 187021 and women
in 1920,22 none of these rights applied to Native Americans, with few
exceptions by treaty,23 until they were granted citizenship in 1924.24 Native
Americans then headed to court to enforce the right to serve as jurors,25

20.
See HRI, Inc. v. EPA, 198 F.3d 1224, 1245 (2000) (holding that the federal
government has a "special trust obligation" to protect the interests of Indian tribes, including
their property). The special relationship between the federal government and tribes is a
product of treaties which created the trust relationship, which is a government-togovernment relationship. The BIA maintains a list of all federally recognized tribes, which
includes communities of Indians and Alaskan Native villages. When referring to this
relationship this paper will refer to "tribes." However, in the complex rubric of Indian law
there are also trust relationships between the federal government and individual Native
Americans. When referring to individual rights and rights as part of the group, including
Native Hawaiians, but not as a government, this paper will refer to "Native Americans."
See also Stuart Minor Benjamin, Equal Protection and the Special Relationship: The Case
of Native Hawaiians, 106 YALE L.J. 537 (1996).
21.
U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
22.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
23.
STEPHEN L. PREVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 236 n.l (Norman
Dorsen ed., 2d ed. 1992).
24.
8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2000).
25.
See Denison v. State, 268 P.2d 617 (Ariz. 1928).
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attend public school, z6 obtain a business license,27 or receive municipal
services. 28 The right of Native Americans to vote was not fully resolved
until 1975.29
While all of the monumental and hard fought victories in the pursuit
of equal access to the accoutrements of life for Native Americans were
being established, there was little or no focus upon the rights to personal
property, family property, or the accumulated cultural property of groups.
Certainly the standards for analyzing property rights under the Fifth
Amendment are identical to those for analyzing the right to equal
protection for all citizens of the United States, as administered by the states
subject to the Fourteenth Amendment. 30 Emancipated slaves may have had
little personal property. However, they and new immigrants retained what
little they possessed free of government interference, while the cultural
property of Native Americans during this same period was treated by the
federal government as government property. 31 The assumption of all rights
on conquered territory by the United States government was a particularly
critical issue for Native Americans who had buried their ancestors on this
continent for a millennium or more and were tied to the land in
innumerable ways. Since 1906, the federal government has given permits
for scientific data recovery on federal and Indian lands, which are contracts
between the government and the educational or other contracting institution
for the exhumation and study of items for a period of time, to which those
people or tribes with cultural ties to the area and items have not been a
party. 32 The law regards as government property those items exhumed

26.
See Dewey County v. United States, 26 F.2d 434 (8th Cir. 1928) (recognizing
that Indian children may attend public school regardless of whether tribal land is subject to
state or local taxes).
27.
See Bradley v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 141 P.2d 524 (Ariz. 1943).
28.
See Chase v. McMasters, 573 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1978).
29.
See Goodluck v. Apache County, 417 F. Supp. 13 (D. Ariz. 1975).
30.
See Nicholas v. Tucker, 114 F.3d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1997).
31.
See Antiquities Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-33 (2000); Archaeological Resources
Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470mm (2000). Both laws regulate cultural resources
on federal and Indian land.
32.
See 16 U.S.C. §§ 432, 470cc. See also Am. Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull,
305 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2002) (dismissing an action involving a gaming license for failure
to join an indispensable party, where the tribes were not parties to the action and the tribes
had a gaming compact with the state); Lummi Nation v. Golder Assoc., Inc., 236 F. Supp.
2d 1183 (W.D. Wa. 2002) (determining the tribe was a third party beneficiary to a contract
for archaeology between the city and the private archaeology contracting firm and could
bring a claim for damages for negligence by the firm).
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subject to the permits, although effectively the33items have remained in the
control of the contractor for an indefinite basis.
Therefore, while Native Americans should enjoy equal protection of
the law, as residents of the United States, whether they live on or off
reservations and regardless of state boundary, a dichotomy has persisted in
the ways in which Native Americans are treated.34 The disparity in
treatment is particularly evident in the regard for Native American cultural
property, as will be further discussed below in detail. Before embarking on
a further discussion of cultural property, however, it would seem
appropriate at this point to review those aspects of Indian law which set the
stage for the special, but less than equal, treatment of Indians.
II.

A SHORT HISTORY OF INDIAN LAW: SPECIAL IS NOT EQUAL

The history of Indians in America is a story written by the victorious.
If one examines an American history textbook, it begins with the discovery
of America and its exploration and conquest by the Spanish, Dutch, French
and English. If mentioned as part of the story at all, Indians are described
as early hosts, and later renegades, in the path of the manifest destiny of a
nation's westward expansion. 35 Indian history is taught in pre-collegiate
courses as a footnote to American history, sanitized of the genocide and
savagery perpetrated by pioneers and the American military on Indians. It
is no wonder that the very idea of what constitutes Indian culture as held by
non-Indian lawyers and jurists who enforce the constitutional guarantees of
equal protection, is a product of popular movies and the occasional trip to
an Indian art market for the very fortunate.
The Indian policy of the United States is largely attributed to Thomas
Jefferson who established as his legacy the dichotomy of treating tribes as
independent nations,36 not requiring government support for their survival
even as their lands were diminished, and "domestic dependent nations, 37

33.
See 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(b)(3); Curation of Federally-Owned and Administered
Archeological Collections, 36 C.F.R. §§ 79.1-79.11 (2003) (setting standards for the long
term control by the federal government of items retrieved in part in the execution of ARPA
permits).
34.
See generally Blake A. Watson, The Thrust and Parry of Federal Indian Law,
23 U. DAYTON L. REV. 437 (1998) (discussing the inconsistency in federal Indian law).
35.
Fergus M. Bordewich, Revolution in Indian Country, 47 AM. HERITAGE 34, 43
(July/Aug. 1996).
36.
See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). According to the Court,
the tribes retained "their original natural rights." Id. at 559.
37.
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
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under the regulation of Congress, 38 so that they might not have the ability
to make alliances with the British. 39 This policy and the court cases
enforcing it established a special relationship between the federal
government and the tribes, that has been described as a trust relationship,
that of the United States as a guardian for its wards, the tribes. 4° While it
would seem that this "special" relationship would mean that Indians must
receive at least equal treatment under the law, in historical fact, the
opposite has been true. That Indians had a special status with the federal
government was used as a basis by states to deny equal protection for
Native Americans under state law.4 1 In meeting its trust obligation, the
United States has had "a critical failure in the perception of the FederalIndian relationship.A 2 The Indian Civil Rights Act of 196843 actually had
the effect of narrowing the rights of tribes and imposing federal regulation
on internal tribal affairs. 44
Another view of the policy toward Indians is that the attitudes
developed much earlier as Columbus brought to the new territory an old
world ethic "which justified denying rights of self-rule and property to
peoples whose cultures and religions were different from Christian
Europeans that was already nearly four centuries old by the time Columbus
reached the new world." 45 The crusader ethic of cultural racism held that if
the occupants of an area desired for conquest could be dismissed as
heathens and infidels, then their subjugation and appropriation of their
property would be justified in the name of Christian European norms for
society. To seal the justification of preemption, the conquered must be

38.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause states "[t]he Congress shall
have Power... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes." Id.
39.

See generally ANTHONY F.C. WALLACE, JEFFERSON AND THE INDIANS (1999).

40.
See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886); Davids v. Coyhis, 869
F. Supp. 1401 (E.D. Wis. 1994).
See supra notes 25-29.
41.
42.
TASK FORCE No. 9, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION: FINAL
REPORT 27 (Comm. Print 1976). See, e.g., Manchester Band of Pomo Indians, Inc. v.
United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v.
Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 499 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
43.
25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-41 (2000).
44.
See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (holding that the Constitution does
not require fidelity from tribes as tribes are self governing).
45.
Robert A. Williams, Jr., Columbus's Legacy: The Rehnquist Court's
Perpetuation of European Cultural Racism Against American Indian Tribes, 39 FED. B.
NEWS & J. 358. 360 (1992).
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seen as savages, devoid of religion, and in need of conversion to
Christianity.
In the new world John Cabot was given the authority to take the towns
belonging to the infidels by King Henry VII in 1497.46 The process of
converting to Christianity all of the Indians not annihilated thus began and
persisted for the next 400 years. In the post Civil War years, when African
Americans were set free to devise a life for themselves, Native Americans
were living on reservations still under the control of the federal
government, which allocated each of the tribal lands among the major
religions, with each church assigned federal funds to engage in the
"civilizing process" of Native Americans. 47 Native Americans were to be
assimilated sans their property, native languages, religions and cultural
practices.
By 1887, there were almost 300 Indian reservations established by
treaties between the tribes and the federal government. Some reservations
were established on the ancestral homeland of the tribes, such as the
Navajo and Hopi in the west, while others were "removed" from eastern
states to reservations in Oklahoma,48 where tribal distinctions were not
always respected in the conglomeration of tribes into reservation
boundaries. While the bargained-for peace placed Native Americans in a
barely sustainable position, socially and economically, they were free from
annihilation in what Indian law scholar Charles Wilkinson refers to as a
"measured separatism. ' 49 Any hope that the Indians held that the United
States would abide by these treaties was dispelled by the passage of the
General Allotment Act, commonly known as the Dawes Act of 1887.50
The Dawes Act allowed reservation land to be divided into parcels owned
by individual tribal members, which they could then sell and thus disperse
the tribe into the community as a final act of assimilation. The lands could
then be placed into the marketplace. By the time the Dawes Act was
repealed by the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,51the size of reservation
land in the United States was reduced to less than a third of what it had
been almost fifty years before.52 The Dawes Act left within the exterior

46.
Id. at 361.
47.
Monroe E. Price, Indian-FederalRegulations From the Inside Out: A Comment
on Perry Dane's Meditation, 12 CARDOzO L. REV. 1007, 1012 (1991).
48.
Indian Removal Act, 4 Stat. 411 (1830).
49.
CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 13 (1987).
50.
Dawes Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 331-33 (repealed 2000), 334, 339, 341, 342, 348, 349, 354, 381 (2000)).
51.
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (2000)).
52.
See generally Williams, supra note 45, at 363-64.
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boundaries of a reservation privately held "in-holdings," the regulation of
which has been a source of ongoing contention. Then between 1954 and
1966 Congress used its authority again, this time to terminate over one
hundred tribes, mostly in Oregon and California, thus ending any
obligation to provide services predicated on earlier treaties.53
The courts perpetuated the idea of the American savage in a refusal to
apply either common law concepts of property law or Constitutional
precepts to Indians. The 1823 decision of Chief Justice John Marshall in
Johnson v. M'Intosh54 is regarded as the beginning of United States Federal
Indian law. In the case, both parties purchased the same parcels of land;
the plaintiffs made their purchases directly from the Indian land owners
prior to the Revolutionary War, and the defendants bought the same land
from the United States after the conclusion of the peace treaty between the
United States and Great Britain. At issue was "the power of Indians to
give, and of private individuals to receive, a title which can be sustained in
the Courts of this country. 55 If the Court applied the common law of
property and recognized the ownership of the plaintiffs, it would then give
legitimacy to, and recognize the equal rights of, Indians to own and transfer
title in property. Instead, the Court held that American Indian tribes had no
power to transfer title to lands as they held no legally enforceable rights to
the land. Justice Marshall based the decision on the Doctrine of
Discovery,56 defined as "an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of
occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest. '' 57 The natural right to own
and contract for property and exclude trespassers, enforced for farmers and
merchants, would not be extended to Indians.58
That the legacy of Johnson has proceeded into the twentieth century
and overtaken the holding in Worcester v. Georgia59 can be seen in the
Supreme Court decisions: Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,60 which
placed limits on tribal sovereignty by denying tribes criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians who commit crimes on Indian land in violation of tribal
law; Montana v. United States,61 which limited civil jurisdiction over nonIndians who hunt and fish on the reservation in violation of tribal code; and

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

See PREVAR, supra note 23, at 57.
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
Id. at 572.
Id. at 573-75.
Id. at 587.
Id. at 591-92.
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515.
435 U.S. 191 (1978).
450 U.S. 544 (1981).
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62
Brendale v. ConfederatedTribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation
63 both of which limited the extent of tribal
and Strate v. A-i Contractors,
regulatory jurisdiction and authority within Indian country to a strict
interpretation of Indian land, not to include private in-holdings or highways
running through the reservation.
Lest the idea that the special and less than equal regard for the human
rights of Native Americans is an historical antiquated notion, or that it only
applies to dismantling Native American society with regard to land and
political organizations, the following discussion of Native American
cultural property law is situated in the present tense and looks at cultural
slavery present in the United States by a refusal of the courts to apply the
common law and constitutional law to human remains, cultural items and
intellectual property of Native Americans. Before looking at the present
state of special and less than equal regard for the cultural property rights of
Native Americans in contemporary society, it is necessary to introduce the
central figure in this discussion, Geronimo.

III. GERONIMO: FROM ARIZONA TO FLORIDA
In contrast to much of what is written about Indian history by nonIndians, the story of Geronimo is known from his own words as dictated in
19 0 6

.64

Geronimo was born in Arizona in 1829, during a period of

peaceful relations among the Apache tribes and between the Apaches and
the Mexicans in the area. By age seventeen he was admitted to the council
of warriors, married and thereafter had three children. Then, in the summer
of 1858, when on a trip to the Mexican state of Chihuahua to trade for
supplies, while the men were in town, Mexican troops raided the
encampment where the women, children and a token guard remained,
slaughtered the Apaches in a grisly manner and took whatever they could.
The dead included the mother, wife and three children of Geronimo.6 5
Geronimo returned from the town to face his worst nightmare, a scene from
which he never recovered. He returned to Arizona, united several Apache
tribes and waged war on the Mexicans until his arrest and transfer to the

62.
492 U.S. 408 (1989).
520 U.S. 438 (1997). See also Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Red Wolf, 196 F.3d
63.
1059 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the tribal court lacks jurisdiction over a tort action arising
from an accident on a railroad right-of-way that crosses the reservation).
64.
65.

GERONIMo, GERONIMO'S STORY OF His LIFE (S.M. Barrett ed., 1906).
ODIE B. FAULK, THE GERONIMO CAMPAIGN 21 (1969). Geronimo was the

grandson of Maco, Chief of the Mimbreno Apaches, but was, under the Apache matrilineal
rules of descent, a Bedonkohe Apache.
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San Carlos Reservation in Arizona in 1877. Keeping Geronimo on a
reservation was not an easy task. While other Apache tribes were fighting
with the American Army, Geronimo used the diversion to head back into
Mexico in 1881, where he visited his vengeance on Mexican towns until
his surrender in 1884, when he was returned to San Carlos.66
The Arizona territory in the post-Civil War era was filled with an
abundance of soldiers needing a cause. The soldiers were employed to
hold the Apaches on the reservation in a constant state of near starvation
and without the ability to learn new skills that would assist Indians in
becoming self-sufficient, for fear that they would succeed.67 Those with
the most to lose were a group of profiteers in Tucson, known as the
"Tucson Ring," who were adept at perpetuating an Apache scare in
Washington, which would bring in more troops and further their business
ventures in government procurement contracts. 68 By 1885, Geronimo lost
all patience with the rules placed on his people by government agents. He
and several other chiefs left the reservation in an act of defiance that must
have struck fear into all those living in the Southwest. The Army
responded by murdering Apaches whether or not they were combatants.
Initially, Geronimo surrendered to General Cook, whom he trusted to end
the slaughter of Apaches. 69 The surrender agreement was frustrated by the
Tucson Ring, which is credited with delivering rumors to Geronimo that he
would be murdered upon return, causing him to flee deeper into Mexico,
where he eluded capture until late 1886. Geronimo was enticed to finally
surrender on the basis that he, his extended family and his followers, would
be removed from Arizona to Fort Marion, Florida, where they could live in
peace. In defiance of the terms of the surrender, Geronimo was kept
imprisoned apart from his family in Fort Pickens, Florida.7 °
Geronimo was held as a prisoner of war in Fort Pickens where he was
forced into hard labor, while all those who had something to do with his
capture, except General Cook, glorified themselves in the press as having
valiantly suppressed the savages. 7' Eventually, Geronimo was moved to
Fort Sill, Oklahoma, where he adapted to his life as a farmer. Later in life
he capitalized on the glorified notions of his life and found work in "Wild
West" shows.72 When Geronimo died on February 17, 1909, his status was

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 25.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 90-9 1.
Id. at 174.
FAULK, supra note 65, at 207.
Id. at 210.
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that of a war prisoner and he was buried at Fort Sill in the Apache
cemetery.73
Controversy over the human remains of Geronimo began shortly after
his burial. It was thought that he was exhumed shortly after the funeral by
family and secretly taken back to somewhere in New Mexico. Others
believed that the talk of exhumation was a rumor started by family to ward
off those who would desecrate the burial looking for souvenirs. 74 Still
others believe that six young Army captains, including the grandfather of
President George W. Bush, Prescott Bush, partially exhumed the remains in
1918 and ensconced the skull in the Museum of the Skull and Bones, the
secret society at Yale.75 As will be discussed below, controversy over the
remains of the great chief have persisted for ninety years.
Such
controversy is illustrative of the way in which Native American human
remains, and indeed the rights of Native Americans to determine the
disposition of the remains of their dead, are currently viewed.
The following discussion takes a mythological Geronimo through time
to the present to view treatment under the law of Native American cultural
beliefs as expressed in cultural practices, songs and ceremonies, as well as
personal property for the dead and burials, that is, the cultural property of
Native Americans. This discussion will turn to cultural property laws that
protect cultural property rights, which begs the question of what might
occur if equal protection of the law were afforded to Native Americans as it
is to all other segments of American society. Would "special" laws be
necessary, or would such laws simply be the further codification of
property rights already existing in the common law, general cultural
property legislation and constitutional law, which could and should be
extended to Native Americans? These questions are divided into types of
cultural property as follows:
*
If Geronimo was Jewish, what protections would be enforced to
protect the cultural property of Native Americans as have been afforded to
those subject to the atrocities of the Nazis in World War II?
*
If Geronimo was a rap star, would the intellectual property of his
people, their songs and ceremonies, be given the same protection bestowed
on artists in the recording industry?

73.
Id. at 214.
Jd. at 216.
74.
75.
See Brenda Norrell, Geronimo's Remains Still Held by Skull and Bones?,
available at http://www.rense.comlgenera142/held.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2003). See
also Tim Giago, Where Are They Hiding Geronimo's Skull?, LAKOTA NATION J. (Sept. 3,
2000), available at http://www.georgewalkerbush.net/wherearetheyhidinggeronimosskull.
htm-
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*
If Geronimo was an air traveler, would his human remains be
accorded the same respect as provided for the victims of airline tragedies?
Certainly, there has been some special legislation to address Native
American cultural property, which has received mixed support in the courts
of law and public opinion. While a disparity of application of law to tribes
and Native Americans is easily seen, the explanation is elusive. If there is
recognition of the applicability of equal protection of the law for Native
American cultural property, whether it is physical property, intellectual
property, or human remains and burials, then any distinction in treatment
should be a violation of constitutional law.
IV. IF GERONIMO WAS JEWISH

In the center of Prague there is a short narrow alleyway, which is
home to three synagogues, a testament to the size of the Jewish population
that found refuge in this city of religious tolerance prior to World War II.
At the alley entrance sits a small stone structure reputed to be the oldest
intact synagogue in Europe. At the end of the alley is another synagogue,
which is the gateway to the cemetery housing headstones set as close
together as books on a shelf. A sign at the entrance reads, "crowded in life,
crowded in death." At the mid-point on the alley there is a third
synagogue, remodeled during the war by the occupying Nazi forces to
establish the Museum of the Extinct Race. During the war this facility was
the collection point for numerous objects of Jewish religious practice taken
from synagogues across Europe. No doubt this occurred at the time of the
arrest of the congregations and the burning of the structures. In recent
years, the museum was reopened as an interpretive center, so that the
lessons of history would not be lost, nor repeated. Many of the items
collected by the Nazis remain in the glass display cases, while others have
been repatriated, if not to the original congregations, then to other Jewish
congregations throughout the world.
The appropriation of religious items from Jews was just part of the
theft and coercive transfers of art and other personal property perpetrated
by the Nazi regime from 1933 through the end of the war.76 At the close of
the war, Allied forces took possession of the recovered art, religious items
and currency and made an attempt to return all of the property when an
owner or heir could be identified. That zealous effort is ongoing. 77
Unfortunately, those items and family records held by the Russians could

76.
77.

See generally LYNN H. NICKOLAS, THE RAPE OF EUROPA (1995).
Id. at 327-67. 407-44.
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not be accessed until the late 1980s and into the 1990s. 78 Thus, the
evaluation of items as property of victims of the Holocaust is continuing
sixty years later.
In the United States, the response to requests from victims of the
Holocaust for assistance in retrieving property has been enthusiastic.
Congress responded with the Holocaust Victim Redress Act of 1998, 79
which focused upon gold and other monetary assets of survivors, as well as
cultural property, including art and religious items. The Act initially
appropriated five million dollars for archival research and created the
Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets in the United
States, tasked with keeping track of the efforts to assist claimants and to
recommend additional efforts as needed. The American Association of
Museums (AAM) has been exemplary in its voluntary efforts to facilitate
the return to Holocaust survivors of items, which may be found in
museums in the United States.8 °
The process for the evaluation of Nazi-era items, as outlined by AAM,
begins with a search by the museum of its entire collection for "covered
objects," which may have been created prior to 1946 and acquired after
1932 and which may have been in continental Europe between those
dates. 8' Museums are then advised to make the information easily
accessible to the public. Museums are not asked to give up items where a
lawful chain of ownership can be shown by the museum, nor are they
excoriated as complicit in wrongful acts. Rather, the museum community
has taken the position that museums may have entered into otherwise
lawful transactions, where there is a cloud on the title, which they shall
voluntarily rectify as responsible stewards of the collections they hold and
manage.82 This admirable approach is also consistent with the common
law of property, which states that one cannot obtain lawful title to an item
that was obtained in an unlawful manner in the first instance.

78.
See Elaine L. Johnston, Cultural Property and World War I: Implicationsfor
American Museums, Practical Considerationsfor the Museum Administrator, ALI-ABA
COURSE OF STUDY: LEGAL PROBLEMS OF MUSEUM ADMINISTRATION 29 (1998).
Pub. L. No. 105-158, 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. (112 Stat. 15).
79.
See NANCY H. YIEDE ET AL., THE AAM GUIDE TO PROVENANCE RESEARCH
80.
(2001); HELEN J. WECHSLER ET AL., MUSEUM POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR NAZI-ERA

ISSUES (Roxana Adams ed., 2001). AAM also sponsors a Nazi-Era Provenance Internet
Portal (http://www.aam-us.org; http://www.nepip.org) and seminars (the most recent was in
December, 2003).
WECHSLER, supra note 80, at XV.
81.
82.
See id. at 65 (directing provenance research without an assessment of fault to
move the process of seeking truth forward).
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The zeal with which the government and museums in the United
States have addressed the issues of Nazi looted cultural property has not
been replicated with regard to the cultural property of Native Americans.
Certainly collection of Native American items has occurred since the
landing of the first Europeans in the new world, and there are innumerable
items of Native American art lawfully held in museums and by individuals
throughout the world. The issue is not whether tribes can claim an interest
in all things Indian, but whether those items not lawfully removed from
tribes and individual Native Americans in the first instance should remain
in the hands of the possessor in the face of a claim from the lawful owner.
In this regard, tribes and Native American individuals ask not for special
treatment, but for equal protection of their property rights under the
common law of property. If Geronimo was Jewish, he would ask that the
same fiduciary standards of the federal government and museums as
applied to Nazi-era covered objects be applied to conquest-era collected
items. Sadly, this has not been the case.
Historically, the cultural property of Native Americans in the United
States has been treated as government property subject to government
regulation, 83 which was intended as an assertion of protective authority
over the open land in order to stem the rampant looting of sites both Indian
and non-Indian. 84 Vandalism and looting of ancient Indian sites began with
the arrival of the first Europeans and spread westward as development of
the railroads afforded access to relic hunters.85 Federal agents work
valiantly to cover vast territory, with few rangers, in an effort to prosecute
those who 86rob the land of a "'veritable museum of archaeological
treasures.
Tribes appreciate the efforts of the federal government to protect sites
and prosecute those who would mine the areas for personal gain. The
differences between federal regulators and protectors of sites and Native
Americans are ones of perspective. Cultural property legislation refers to
"antiquities" and "archaeological resources" and seeks to protect
government property from the loss of knowledge that could be gained by
trained scientists. Native Americans see these same sites as places of
cultural heritage, personal history and as sacred sites of their people. The

83.
See supra notes 31-32. The authority of the federal government to issue
permits for archaeological excavation on lands owned or controlled by the federal
government is in the Antiquities Act (1906), and for federal and Indian lands, including
United States territories, is in the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (1979).
See MIKE TONER, THE PAST IN PERIL 76 (2002).
84.
85.
SHERRY HUTT ET AL., ARCHEOLOGICAL RESOURCE PROTECTION 18-19 (1992).
86.
TONER, supra note 84, at 94.
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federal government presumes ownership of items on the land, while tribes
and individual Native Americans may have ownership interests or common
law rights in items placed on the land that are preempted by those
assumptions.
ARPA allows for permits for scientific data recovery and the retention
of items in federal and educational repositories for study,87 but those
permits are agreements between the federal government and the scientist or
his or her institution. Tribes are not parties to the permits.8 8 ARPA does
not give Native Americans access to the items retrieved in archaeological
excavations, the ability to monitor the study, or to obtain the items after a
reasonable period of study. The length of the study is controlled by the
federal government. The ARPA provides that when a permit is requested
of the land manager for a study that will occur on Indian lands the tribe
must give permission, 89 and if the study will occur on federal land, but will
impact a religious or cultural site of a tribe, the tribe must be notified. 9°
The permit request should list the final repository for "copies of records,
data, photographs, and other documents derived from the proposed work,
and all collections in the event the Indian owners do not wish to take
custody or otherwise dispose of the archaeological resources." 9' That the
regulations to ARPA acknowledge Indian ownership of items is a routinely
overlooked provision in the regulations. For the "Indian owners" to claim
items, they would need knowledge of the items retrieved pursuant to the
permit, the location of the items and the permit would need to contain an
expiration time to enable a tribe to assert custody. Since the inception of
ARPA, permits have not been monitored, time limits have not been
enforced and permits have not been concluded.92 There are no regulations

87.
16 U.S.C. § 470cc (2000).
88.
Tribes do have the authority to issue permits to tribal members on tribal lands if
the tribe has an applicable tribal law. In the absence of tribal law, ARPA is controlling, 43
C.F.R. § 7.5(b)(3) (2003).

89.
90.

16 U.S.C. § 470cc(g)(2).
16 U.S.C. § 470cc(c).

91.
43 C.F.R. §7.6(b)(6) (emphasis added). See the ARPA regulations for permits
and information collection.
92.
There are no records to support the lack of monitoring activity on ARPA
permits. The office responsible for such monitoring is the Archaeology and Ethnography
Division of the National Park Service. The Departmental Consulting Archaeologist is
responsible for that department. In 2002, the author asked the DCA how many ARPA
permits had been concluded since the inception of the law and he responded, "none." It
should be noted that while ARPA standardized the permit process, each federal land
managing agency issuing a permit has oversight responsibilities. The United States Army
Corps of Engineers has undertaken a massive project to document and locate all of the items
removed from government land pursuant to a permit issued by the Corps. The Curation
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to specify how "Indian owners" are to be identified, notified, or how they
may take custody of items.
While ARPA places cultural items in the control of the permittee, the
earlier Antiquities Act presumes that all "gatherings shall be made for
permanent preservation in public museums. 9 3 The only recourse open for
a tribe wishing to assert a common law property right in an item has been
to go to court. In 1897, the Onondaga tribe brought an action to obtain
return of the Wampum Belts from the New York State Museum, but they
were unsuccessful in having the court recognize property rights of the
tribe.94 The Wampum Belts signify the joining of the Onondaga Nation
and were removed from the tribe without permission. The long-standing
and prevailing assumption of museums is that if a museum acquires a
Native American item through purchase or gift, it holds the item lawfully
and does not need to look behind the transaction to assess the ownership
history of the item. 95
In addition to an inability to protect items removed from the land,
tribes have not had success in protecting sacred sites, which include places
of cultural practice on the landscape, even when the requests have been not
for fee title ownership of the land to be given to them, but merely for the
protection of historical cultural practices. Since 1980, tribes have been
rebuffed in court when they have sought protection of: ceremonies on Bear
Butte in South Dakota, the sacred mountain of the Lakota Sioux,
interrupted by tourists; 96 the ancient capital city of the Cherokee nation,
97 Navajo ceremonies on
flooded by a reservoir for a hydroelectric project;98
Rainbow Bridge, opened to tourism at all times; Hopi ceremonies on a

Regulations, 36 C.F.R. §§79.1-79.11 (2003), set the standard for the long-term placement,
care and access to the scientific information obtained through ARPA permits, or activities
pursuant to the National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470a-470x-6 (2000) and
the Reservoir Salvage Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 469-469c.
93.
16 U.S.C. § 432.
94.
Onondaga Nation v. Thacher, 61 N.Y.S. 1027 (N.Y. App. Div. 1899).
95.
See Walter Echo-Hawk, Museum Rights vs. Indian Rights: Guidelines for
Assessing Competing Legal Interests in Native Cultural Resources, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 437 (1986).
96.
Crow v. Gullet, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983).
Sequoyah v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980).
97.
Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980). But see Natural Arch and
98.
Bridge Soc'y v. Alston, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D. Utah 2002) (dismissing plaintiffs' claim
and holding that the National Park Service did not violate the First Amendment and force
anyone to engage in the religious practices of the Navajo and Hopi when they restricted
access to the area of the bridge during a tribal sacred ceremony consistent with the Sacred
Sites Executive order 30007). This decision was upheld by the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals on March 23, 2004. Natural Arch and Bridge Soc'y v. Alston, No. 02-4099, 2004
WL 569888, at *5 (10th Cir. Mar. 23, 2004).
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sacred mountain, which became a ski resort; 99 and the Hoopa ceremonial
sites in California, disturbed by logging roads. 1°0 In these cases involving
the free exercise of religion, the courts have held that the government has
the authority to use its land in the public interest and to impose restrictions
as the desire of the tribes to conduct ceremonies would be a violation of the
First Amendment Establishment Clause. However, the Supreme Court has
not been constrained by the Establishment Clause when relying on the Free
Exercise Clause to allow non-Indians the freedom to continue cultural
traditions unimpeded by state action. 0 1
Having failed to obtain equal protection of law in the courts, tribes
turned to the Congress. Two pieces of legislation are notable as they
specifically apply to Native American cultural property and respect the
rights of federally-recognized tribes to regulate tribal cultural property.
These are the 1992 amendments to the National Historic Preservation Act
(NHPA), 0 2 and the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation
Act of 1990 (NAGPRA).' °3 While the American Indian Religious Freedom
Act (AIRFA)1°4 and the Sacred Sites Executive Order'05 were intended to
provide Native Americans with the ability to act unfettered by the
government in the practice of traditional religion, they do not provide the
compliance and enforcement mechanisms available in the NHPA and
NAGPRA.'06

99.
Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
100.
101.
See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that members of the
Conservative Amish Mennonite Church should not be required by state law to send their
children to school beyond the sixth grade as it violated their cultural practices). In the
Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-137, 117 Stat.
1827, §315 (2003), the United States Congress has granted exclusive management of an
expansive area of public land, otherwise under the domain of the Bureau of Land
Management, to the Mormon Church, which claimed a need to control the area, which is
sacred to Mormons, in a manner consistent with church doctrine. The area known as
"Martin's Cove," has been leased to the Mormon Church for twenty-five years. For a
description of the area and discussion of the issues, see Kirk Johnson, Mormons 'Own'
Site's Story, DESERET MORNING NEWS, Jan. 26, 2004, http://deseretnews.com/dn/view/

0,1 249,590038698,00.html.
102.
16 U.S.C. §§ 470a-470x-6 (2000).
103.
25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-13 (2000).
104.
42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1994).
105.
Exec. Order No. 13,007, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771 (May 24, 1996).
See Lyng, 485 U.S. 439. But see Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 2
106.
F. Supp. 2d 1448 (D. Wyo. 1998) (holding not unconstitutional a ban, instituted by the
National Park Service pursuant to NHPA and the Sacred Sites Executive Order, on climbing
on Devil's Tower during the month of June to respect the religious practice of a tribe).
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The NHPA now provides several avenues for tribes to assert equal
protection of the law for the cultural property and practices of the tribe.
First, on tribal land, the tribe may assume the historic preservation duties
under the law and no longer be bound by the decisions of the State Historic
Preservation Officer (SHPO) in the designation of sites on tribal land that
are eligible for nomination to the National Register and thus, the tribe may
determine which sites to protect from development. The NHPA allows for
the Tribal Historic Preservation Officer (THPO) to assume the duties of the
SHPO.' °7 The 1999 Regulations to the NHPA make it clear that THPOs
are on an equal level with SHPOs.'0 8 Second, the NHPA allows
"[p]roperties of traditional religious and cultural importance to an Indian
tribe or Native Hawaiian organization" (TCP) to be determined as eligible
for inclusion on the National Register. 1°9 Such sites may occur in the
natural landscape such as mountain peaks. Third, the NHPA includes
Native American cultural sites when fostering protection of sites on private
land by offering grant and tax assistance to private property owners for site
preservation." l0 The federal government shall also encourage private
property owners to give notice to, and consult with, Indian tribes or Native
Hawaiian organizations prior to excavating or disposing of11 Native
American cultural items in which the groups may have an interest.
NAGPRA is the quintessential equal protection law for Native
American cultural property.'l 2 "The NAGPRA represents the culmination
of 'decades of struggle by Native American tribal governments and people
to protect against grave desecration, to [effect the repatriation of] thousands
of dead relatives or ancestors, and to retrieve stolen or improperly acquired
cultural property."" 13

107.
108.
109.

110.

16 U.S.C. § 470a(d)(2) (2000).
64 Fed. Reg. 11,736 (March 9, 1999) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 61).
16 U.S.C. § 470a(d)(6)(A).
16 U.S.C. § 470h-4(b)(3).

16 U.S.C. § 470h-4(b)(4)(D).
111.
See Sherry Hutt & C. Timothy McKeown, Control of Cultural Property as
112.
Human Rights Law, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 363 (1999), for a discussion on NAGPRA as applying
the common law of property to Native Americans; Jack F. Trope & Walter R. Echo-Hawk,
The Native American Graves Protection and RepatriationAct: Background and Legislative
History, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35 (1992).

113.
San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 2d 860, 886-87 (D.
Ariz. 2003) (quoting Yankton Sioux Tribe v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 83 F.
Supp. 2d 1047, 1055 (D.S.D. 2000)). The Yankton case is still in litigation, but the court in
San Carlos, found that "NAGPRA is not prospective and is triggered only after a person has
made an inadvertent discovery." San Carlos,272 F. Supp. 2d at 889. Apparently courts are
still not willing to accept the prospective planning provision in NAGPRA involving
"[i]ntentional excavation." 25 U.S.C. § 3002(c) (2000). An "[i]nadvertent discovery" is
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The unanimous support for the law in Congress reflects an
acknowledgement that the Constitution and all prior property laws, the
common law and legislation, were not being afforded to tribes and Native
American individuals.' 4 NAGPRA does not create any new rights for
tribes or Native Americans. Rather, it applies the common law of property,
enjoyed by all others in the United States, and extends those rights to
disenfranchised tribes and Native Americans, Native Hawaiians and
members of Alaska Village corporations. 115 In so doing, there are four
aspects to NAGPRA. NAGPRA is:
1. Indian law, as it is predicated on the government-to-government
relationship between the federal government and tribes;' 16
and the
2. Property law, as it extends the common law of property
17
owners;'
property
individual
and
tribal
to
Fifth Amendment
3. Human rights law, as it affords rights to Native Americans in a
remedial manner;' 18and

one that occurs in the absence of an "intentional excavation," that is, where the likely
affected tribes and agency in charge of the activity have not yet agreed on a plan in the event
of a discovery. Those agencies following the San Carlos rationale are doomed to thirty-day
work stoppages upon each discovery. See 25 U.S.C. § 3002(d)(1) (2000). Planned
intentional excavation is preferred in the law, while inadvertent discovery requires delay and
remedial action.
114.
See C. Timothy McKeown & Sherry Hutt, In the Smaller Scope of Conscience:
The Native American Graves Protection & RepatriationAct Twelve Years After, 21 UCLA
J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 153 (2002/2003), for a legislative history of the law, development of
the regulations and a detailed analysis of the components of the law and court decisions.
Hutt & McKeown, supra note 112, at 366-67.
115.
116.
25 U.S.C. § 3010 (2000).
117.
25 U.S.C. § 3001(3) identifies NAGPRA protected property as human remains
and cultural items, which include funerary objects, sacred objects and objects of cultural
patrimony. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(13) requires that no Fifth Amendment taking be caused by
this law in that no museum will be forced to give up property lawfully held and tribes will
not be made to continue in a government process which does not take into consideration the
common law of property and apply it to tribes.
PROPERTY

LAW:

A

PRACTITIONER'S

See SHERRY HUTr ET AL., CULTURAL

GUIDE TO THE MANAGEMENT,

PROTECTION

PRESERVATION OF HERITAGE RESOURCES 26-27 (Am. Bar Ass'n 2004).

AND

The intent of

Congress, as seen in the early drafting stages, was to "promulgate guidelines and regulations
for repatriation of human remains, ceremonial objects and grave goods consistent with
American common law and principles of Federal Indian Law." Native American Museum
Claims Commission Act: Hearing on S.187 Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian
Affairs, 100th Cong. 33 (1988).
McKeown & Hutt, supra note 114, at 155 (asserting that property rights
118.
guaranteed to Native Americans by NAGPRA are already guaranteed to them by the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments; thus, NAGPRA is remedial and is human rights legislation).
See Hearing on S. 1021 and S.1980 Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs,
101st Cong. 192 (1990) (statement of Walter Echo-Hawk that the courts were not enforcing
the property rights of Native Americans); Protection of Native American Graves and the
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4. Administrative procedure law, as it sets forth a process to
remediate past inappropriate assumptions about tribal and Native American
cultural property as government property, without input from those with a
first party interest in the items. 119
NAGPRA protects four types of cultural property: human remains,
funerary items, sacred items and items of cultural patrimony. 20 Funerary
items held in collections as associated with human remains are treated as
part of the human burial, and unassociated funerary items, those made for
burials and not held in collections with the human remains, are treated as
12
other protected cultural items for purposes of the NAGPRA process.'
"[S]acred objects" are those "specific ceremonial objects which are needed
by traditional Native American religious leaders for the practice of
22
traditional Native American religions by their present day adherents.'1
These may be communally or individually owned, depending on the rules
of the tribe at the time the item left the possession of the owner. Cultural
patrimony may only be communally owned as, at the time it left the group,
it was the inalienable property of the group and had ongoing central
importance to the history and meaning of the group. 23 The law will not
remove items from owners who have a right of possession, but it does seek
to restore possession to those whose rights were abridged. 124 Items that are
in federal agency and museum 25 collections by virtue of a government
issued permit, transferred in the marketplace by covert means, acquired
through military conquest, or other means by which property was
transferred without the knowledge and consent of the owner, may be
repatriated to their lawful owners through claims made by those with
standing, that is, federally recognized tribes and Native Hawaiian

Repatriationof Human Remains and Sacred Objects: Hearing on H.R. 1381, H.R. 1646 and

H.R. 5237 Before the House Comm. on Interiorand Insular Affairs, 101st Cong. 47 (1990)
("Protection of Native American burial grounds is not just a matter of safeguarding
archaeological resources, nor is it just against grave robbing for profit. Most importantly, it
is a matter of civil rights for the Indians and for protecting the rights of religious freedom.")
(statement of Rep. Bennett).
119.
25 U.S.C. § 3002 (2000) (determination of ownership upon discovery); 25
U.S.C. § 3005 (2000) (repatriation of items in collections).
120.
25 U.S.C. § 3001(3) (2000).
121.
25 U.S.C. § 3001(3)(A) (associated funerary objects); 25 U.S.C. § 3001 (3)(B)
(unassociated funerary objects).
122.
25 U.S.C. § 3001(3)(C) (2000).
123.
25 U.S.C. § 3001(3)(D) (2000).
124.

25 U.S.C. § 3001(13) (2000).

125.
25 U.S.C. § 3001(8) (2000) (the law has jurisdiction over museums receiving
federal funds).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY IA W REVIEW

[Vol. 24

organizations. 126 Tribal members may make personal claims for their
personal property, or that of their ancestors, if, according to the laws of the
tribe at the time the item was removed, the individual had rights of personal
possession. 27 For Native American cultural items newly discovered or
unearthed on federal or Indian land after the date of the law, November 16,
1990, 2 NAGPRA
provides that a determination of ownership will be
8
made.

If Geronimo was Jewish, he would be in a position to avail himself of
the voluntary efforts of the museum community to self-audit their
collections and make known the location and provenance of items in which
he may have an interest. In contrast, there was no such voluntary effort to
audit federal agency and museum collections to determine the ownership of
Native American cultural items. In the year prior to NAGPRA, Congress
129
passed the National Museum of the American Indian Act (NMAIA),
which established the newest museum on the mall, and set forth a separate
repatriation process for the Smithsonian Institution. That process did not
require an information source for tribes, so that those willing to make a
claim would have no means to know of the location of cultural items in
which they might have an interest. 30 In the ensuing year, Congress added
within NAGPRA a detailed process for the inventory of human remains
and associated funerary objects,' 3' and the more general summary of
potential cultural items,132 that is, unassociated funerary objects, sacred
objects and objects of cultural patrimony, which may be in the repository.
In rectifying the shortcomings of the NMAIA process, Congress also
established in NAGPRA a process for the dissemination of information to
and consultation with tribes to further refine the information known to the
repository. 33 This enabled tribes to learn of the location of items, so that

126.
25 U.S.C. § 3005 (2000).
127.
McKeown & Hutt, supra note 114, at 165-66 (stating that according to the laws
of the tribe certain ceremonial items may be owned by the individual or the tribe and the
party with the right of possession at the time the item was removed without permission of
the lawful entity would be entitled to make a NAGPRA claim).

128.
129.

25 U.S.C. § 3002.
20 U.S.C. § 80q (2000).

130.
Id. The original NMAI Act did require the Smithsonian Institution museums to
complete an inventory of human remains and funerary items, but there was no date for
completion and none was completed prior to the amendments in 1996. See infra note 133.
131.
25 U.S.C. § 3003 (2000).
132.
25 U.S.C. § 3004 (2000).
133.
25 U.S.C. §§ 3003(b)(1)(C), (b)(2) (inventory), 3004(b)(1), (b)(2) (summary)
(2000).
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they might make decisions on what items to claim.13The
NMAIA has since
4
been amended to conform to the NAGPRA process.
Obtaining compliance with the disclosure provisions of NAGPRA
from federal agencies and museums has been a long and sometimes
difficult journey. The drafters of the law anticipated such a result and
included a Review Committee in the statute, charged with facilitating
disclosure and dispute resolution. 35 The Secretary of the Interior has the
authority to issue penalty assessments against museums that do not comply
with disclosure. 136 Twenty-two formal allegations of non-compliance have
been lodged since the regulations first went into effect in 1997, three of
which were found to be without merit, six were given periods of
forbearance and the remainder38are still pending.137 To date, no museum has
been assessed a civil penalty.
When tribes have been frustrated in obtaining compliance with the
NAGPRA process, they have gone directly to court. If the statute of
limitations for penalty assessments runs against those museums for which
complaints are pending, then the tribes would have no recourse but to
proceed to court to assert common law claims to the items at issue. While
this would lead to a cumbersome discovery process in the absence of
NAGPRA disclosure documents, the tribes would not be encumbered by a
statute of limitations. 39 In the nine NAGPRA collections related cases
4
resolved to date, all have upheld the NAGPRA disclosure requirements. 0
Legislation to protect Native American, Native Hawaiian and Alaska
Village corporation (ANCSA) cultural property rights offers equal
protection, but to make such laws meaningful, these groups must be part of
the process when decisions are made that will affect them. Perhaps the
most profound step in the advancement of equal protection of Native

134.
See National Museum of the American Indian Amendments Act, S. 3217, 101st
Cong. (1990); 20 U.S.C. § 80q-1 (2000). See generally McKeown & Hutt, supra note 114,
at 158.
135.

25 U.S.C. § 3006 (2000).

136.
25 U.S.C. § 3007 (2000); 43 C.F.R. § 10.12 (2003).
137.
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Review Committee,
Twenty-Fourth Meeting Minutes (Nov. 8 & 9, 2002), available at http://www.cr.nps.gov/
nagpra/review/meetings/minutes.htm.
138.
There is no time-bar for claims brought to establish title to, or right of
possession of Indians to real or personal property. This would apply if the penalty
provisions are determined to be time barred for lack of government action. Oneida Indian
Nation of N.Y. v. City of Sherrill, New York, 337 F.3d 139, 168 (2d Cir. 2003).
139.
Catawba Indian Tribes of S.C. v. South Carolina, 865 F.2d 1444, 1448 (4th Cir.
1989).
140.
See McKeown & Hutt, supra note 114, at 180-83, for a discussion of the
history of NAGPRA collections litigation.
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American cultural property rights in recent years has been the inclusion of
tribes, Native Hawaiian organizations, ANCSA Corporations and Alaska
Village governments' 4' in consultation. Consultation occurs when tribes
are well-informed and advised of intended federal activity, are given a
meaningful opportunity to have input into the decision making process, and
the discussion that ensues is given serious consideration in the final
analysis. 142 ARPA, 143 NAGPRA 44 and the NHPA, 145 as well as the
National Environmental Policy Act,' 46 recognize the responsibility of the
federal government to consult with tribes on a government-to-government
basis. There have also been five Executive Orders since 1993 that
reaffirm
47
the obligation of the federal government to consult with tribes.

141.
16 U.S.C. § 470w(4) (2000) (ANCSA corporations and Alaska Village
governments are tribes for the purpose of NHPA); 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(4), (5) (ANCSA lands
are tribal lands for the purposes of ARPA).
142.
Pueblo of Sandia v. United States, 50 F.3d 856, 862 (10th Cir. 1995). Failure to
make a reasonable effort at meaningful consultation and to give consideration to tribal
interests in good faith is arbitrary and capricious, as where the USDA Forest Service failed
to acknowledge cultural sites in La Huertas Canyon in New Mexico. Id.
143.
16 U.S.C. § 470cc(c) (2000) (consultation prior to the issuance of a permit for
activity on federal land); 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(g)(2) (2000) (permission on tribal land); 16
U.S.C. § 470gg(c) (2000) (fines and penalties collected from actions on tribal land are
remitted to the tribe); 43 C.F.R. § 7.35(c) (2003) (consultation prior to a permit); 43 C.F.R.
§ 7.16(b)(2) (2003) (consultation with land manager on penalties for violation on Indian
lands); 43 C.F.R. § 7.16(b)(3) (2003) (consultation with land manager on penalties for
violations on federal land affecting tribal cultural or religious sites).
144.
25 U.S.C. § 3004(b)(1)(B) (2000) (consultation in the summary process); 25
U.S.C. § 3003(b)(1)(A) (2000) (consultation in the inventory process); 25 U.S.C. §
3005(a)(3) (2000) (consultation in the repatriation process); 25 U.S.C. § 3002(c)(2) (2000)
(consultation in the excavation process).
145.
16 U.S.C. § 470a(d)(6)(B) (2000) (consultation on TCP); 16 U.S.C. § 470h2(a)(2)(D), (E) (2000) (consultation in the planning, identification and preservation of
historic properties).
146.
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4335 (2000) (consultation on impacts and possible
mitigation).
147.
Exec. Order No. 12,875, 3 C.F.R. 669 (Oct. 26, 1993) (reaffirming the federal
government responsibility to consult with tribes on a government-to-government basis
before taking action on matters that may affect them); Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859
(Feb. I1, 1994) (applying environmental justice precepts to tribes); Exec. Order No. 13,007,
3 C.F.R. 196 (May 24, 1996) (accommodating access to and ceremonial use of Indian sacred
sites by tribes, to avoid adverse impacts to sites and maintain confidentiality); Exec. Order
No. 13,084, 3 C.F.R. 150 (May 14, 1998) (acknowledging burden on the federal government
to initiate consultation with tribes on a government-to-government basis, defer to tribal laws
by waiver); Exec. Order No. 13,175, 3 C.F.R. 304 (Nov. 6, 2000) (requiring each agency to
have a consultation process in place, to establish regular and meaningful consultation with
tribes, to respect treaty rights and to grant wide discretion to tribes in self-governance).
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Taken together, the new laws, amendments to existing laws and the
Executive Orders pertaining to consultation with tribes, occurring in just
the last decade, render this period a momentous one in the advances of
Native Americans toward true equal protection for their rights in cultural
property. Whether these advances will be recognized in the courts remains
to be seen. True equality for cultural property rights would require that
courts acknowledge the common law of property as applicable to tribes,
regardless of the remedial legislation.
V.

IF GERONIMO WAS A RAP STAR: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
VERSUS INTANGIBLES IN NATURAL LAW

Advances in audio and visual recording technology, and the means to
access recordings and to make copies, have put the intellectual property of
songwriters and the studios backing them into the legal limelight.
Certainly, there is a substantial financial investment in the production and
marketing of a recording to be protected from infringement and free riders
in the marketplace. Protection of capital investment and ownership rights
in intellectual property exists in the rubric of intellectual property laws:
copyright, patent, trademark and trade-name.
The conundrum for
Geronimo is whether intellectual property law does apply or should apply
to the songs, ceremonies and symbols of his people, or whether these
intangible vestiges of Native American cultural property are actually
cultural patrimony of the group, inalienable, non-market items, that exist in
the realm of natural law.
Intellectual property is generally divided into two main categories:
industrial property, such as patents, utility models, industrial designs,
trademarks, and trade names; and copyright eligible property, such as
48
literary and artistic works, computer software, and architectural designs.
Plant varieties, farming practices and medicinal use of materials in nature
form another category of ethnobiological knowledge.149 Electronic media
and the arts are protected in the United States by copyright laws, 5 ° the
Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA),' 51 which does not include films, and the
National Film Preservation Act of 1997.152 In addition, the Uniform

148.
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG. (WIPO), INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY NEEDS
AND EXPECTATIONS OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE HOLDERS 31 (2001).

149.
Peoples, 41
150.
151.
152.

Lester I. Yano, Protection of the Ethnobiological Knowledge of Indigenous
UCLA L. REV. 443, 453 (1993).
17 U.S.C. §§ 101-803 (2000).
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
2 U.S.C. §§ 1791-179w (2000).
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Commercial Code regulates the control of artistic expressions and
warranties
upon transfer in the marketplace, 153 which are often works made
15 4
for hire.
To the extent that the intangible cultural property of tribes, such as
songs, ceremonies and cultural practices of a people, were not created for
the marketplace, scholars have argued that these forms of expression do not
fit into the realm of intellectual property simply because they are
identifiable as thoughts, practices and artistic expressions rather than
tangible physical property. 55 Still other scholars take the position that if
scientists capture the cultural practices of Native Americans in their field
notes or on tape and then use them in their publications, those cultural
practices are put into the body of scholarship for the benefit of mankind.
They argue that, "[a] folklorist or
anthropologist could, of course, copyright
156
a specific body of native texts."
If natural law, rather than intellectual property law, is the controlling
doctrine for the intangible cultural property of tribes, then the tribe would
decide what of its property could be placed into the marketplace. Those
commercial items would then transfer into the sphere of intellectual
property laws. The answer to the question of who owns Native American
culture would depend on the decision of the group having natural
ownership otherwise recognized by the common law. An assumption of
transfer of possession and control of intangible property to those who study
Native American culture, because they used the material in their research,
is no more a legitimate assumption of the property of another than is the
retention of Native American human remains removed for study without
the permission of those with the right of authority over them. 157 The

153.
U.C.C. § 2-403 (1992) (transferring of title of goods from seller to buyer
assumes ownership rights in the seller).
154.
17 U.S.C. § 101. See generally HUTT, supra note 117 (Chapter 6: Cultural
Property in the Marketplace).
155.
See Darrell A. Posey, InternationalAgreements and Intellectual PropertyRight
Protection for Indigenous Peoples, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS FOR INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES: A SOURCEBOOK 225, 230 (Tom Greaves ed., 1994) (espousing a sui generis
category, that is of a nature that does not fit into the marketplace).
156.
MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE? 61 (2003).
157.
See Gary L. Francione, Experimentation and the Marketplace Theory of the
First Amendment, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 417, 424 (1987). The access to study material does
not transfer title of that material to the researcher. While the First Amendment protects the
"expressive conduct" of the scientist, it does not guarantee access to research material. Id.
at 422. The author does not accept "the argument that marketplace theory may provide
protection to experimentation through some general right to acquire knowledge ...
marketplace theory cannot accommodate a right to receive that is not in some sense
correlative to a right to transmit information." Id. at 422. See also Robertson, infra note
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intangible property of the Apache- people held as their patrimony under the
natural law of property should not be bounded by the life of Geronimo plus
seventy years,' 58 unless they chose to place certain property into the
marketplace. Air, water and Native American human remains and cultural
items have been regarded as open access items from the time of first
European contact in North America. Air and water are no longer regarded
as boundless commodities free of ownership determinations, while old
assumptions still control Native American culture.
VI. IFGERONIMO WAS AN AIR TRAVELER

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), charged with
devising protocol in the case of an airline tragedy, has published the
"Federal Family Assistance Plan for Aviation Disasters."' 159 According to
the rules, in the event of air fatalities the NTSB will take charge of the
scene, the coroner will be called to assist in identifying the dead, and the
families will be notified based on the best records available, including the
manifest.160 The NTSB will then maintain contact with the families and
work with other organizations to determine the proper disposition of the
remains and the procedures for handling personal effects. 161 There is no
assumption that scientific methods, such as DNA testing, will be used. 162
The airline involved is relieved of duties to the site, is delegated the
responsibility of giving critical information on the flight in its possession to
the NTSB and is responsible for transmitting to the public the information
from the NTSB. 163 The airline is also required to make provisions for the
surviving family to grieve with their deceased relative(s), although the
64
NTSB and not the airline control the morgue and the investigation.'
Transfer of the remains to the family is facilitated promptly by the

183, at 1254 (stating that the government "may require that researchers alter the methods
employed in acquiring knowledge to protect the rights of research subjects").
158.
See the Sonny Bono Copyright Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, §
102, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-04) (2004)) which was upheld by
the Supreme Court in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
159.

NAT'L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., FEDERAL FAMILY ASSISTANCE PLAN FOR AvIATION

DISASTERS (April 12, 2000).

See generally Aviation Disaster Family Assistance Act of

1996,49 U.S.C. §§ 40101-29 (2000).
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

NAT'L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., supra note 159, §7(a) ("NTSB Tasks").
Id. §§ 7(a), 7(b), 7(d).
Id. § 7(a)(11).
Id. § 7(b) ("Airline Tasks").
Id. §§ 7(a), 7(b).
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Department of Health and Human Services. 165 In every manner the human
remains are to be treated with respect. Transfer to the control of the family
of the deceased is to be facilitated, without protracted study or analysis.
The treatment of human remains by the NTSB is not only efficient and
respectful, it is also consistent with the common law of the treatment of
human remains. The common law tradition in the United States is derived
from the Roman Law, 166 which considered human remains, including burial
grounds, to be res religiosae,that is sacred property that is thus res omnium
commercium, not transferable in the marketplace. 167 Family may have
possession of the remains and the authority to determine disposition, but
human remains are not owned in the sense of personal property. 168 in
Roman Law, upon death of a person who lived in servitude, the servitude
was extinguished, 169 and this rule was followed in the slavery period in the
170 so
United States where slaves were released upon death to their family,
I1
remains.
the
of
disposition
the
to
attend
could
members
that family
Currently, in the United States human remains are regarded as "a
'quasi-property' right in the nature of a 'sacred trust."" 172 Relatives of the
deceased are those with the duty of care and the responsibility of
disposition and thus have rights to be protected in the performance of that
service. 173 "'The invasion or violation of [that right] furnishes a ground for

165.

Id. § 7(d).

168.
169.

See id. at 252.
Id. at 265.

ALBERT KOCOUREK & JOHN H. WIGMORE, SOURCES OF ANCIENT AND PRIMITIVE
LAW 88 (1915).
167.
RUDOLPH SOHM, THE INSTITUTES OF ROMAN LAW 226 (4th ed. 1892).
166.

170.

CHARLTON MCILWAIN, DEATH IN BLACK AND WHITE 39 (2003).

During the

slavery period in the United States, blacks were given the ability to bury their own dead in
their custom. Id. At death, the remains of a slave were no longer property and were turned
over to family or the slave community for burial. Douglas R. Egerton, A PeculiarMark of
Infamy: Dismemberment, Burial and Rebelliousness in Slave Societies, in MORTAL REMAINS

156 (Nancy Isenberg & Andrew Burstein eds. 2003). Retention and mutilation of slave
remains by whites occurred as punishment for errant behavior and to protect against
rebellion by the living. Id. at 149, 154. See also KOCOUREK & WIGMORE, supra note 166, at
92 (tracing to the early Gaul tradition the ceasing of servitude at the death of the master and
the sanctity of the burial place to early Egypt, as they studied ancient papyrus, the
translation of which was published in London in 1859).

171.
But see generally BONES IN THE BASEMENT: POSTMORTEM RACISM IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY MEDICAL TRAINING (Robert L. Blakely & Judith M. Harrington eds.,

1997) (discussing that while African-Americans were not treated as humans in life, their
bodies were used without permission of their families for medical research, a fact unearthed
in 1989 at the Medical College of Georgia, Augusta, Georgia).
172.

PERCIVAL E. JACKSON, THE LAW OF CADAVERS AND OF BURIAL AND BURIAL

PLACES 133 (Prentice-Hall, Inc. 2d ed. 1950).
173.
See id. at 132-35.
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a civil action for damages." ' 174 A violation occurs in either of two ways: 1.
Disinterment or putting foreign matter into the grave; 175 or, 2. Interference
with the access to the grave or corpse by the descendents. The age of the
grave or human remains is not a factor as the right is in the living
descendent and the damages are measured76 by their indignity and wounded
feelings, in addition to punitive damages. 1
By the close of the twentieth century, the graves and human remains
of Native Americans were still receiving disparate treatment in the United
States from those of other human remains in derogation of the common
law. 177 This disparity was discussed at length in the congressional hearings
on NAGPRA. 78 Since human remains cannot be owned and the study,
once quickly and respectfully accomplished, should otherwise result in the
immediate release of the remains to the descendants, it would seem that
there could be no basis for the estimated 200,000 Native American human
remains held in federal agency and museum collections, many for fifty
years or more. 17 9 NAGPRA was drafted specifically to rectify this
imbalance. 80

174.
Id. at 133 (quoting Foley v. Phelps, 37 N.Y.S. 471, 474 (N.Y. App. Div. 1896).
See also Charrier v. Bell, 496 So. 2d 601, 605 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that an Indian
burial is an intentional placement, not treasure trove). The court also discussed the ability of
the tribe to bring an action for damages. Id. at 607.
175.
Humphreys v. Bennett Oil Corp., 197 So. 222 (La. 1940) (drilling into graves
and allowing them to fill with oil); Michels v. Crouch, 150 S.W.2d III (Tex. Civ. App.
1941) (plowing over graves).
176.
Jackson, supra note 172, at 154-55. Removal of a body by the one in
possession or the trustee without the necessary religious rites and without notice to family is
sufficient for a cause of action. See also Koerber v. Patek, 102 N.W. 40 (Wis. 1905); Hines
v. State, 149 S.W. 1058 (Tenn. 1911) (interference with access cases).
177.
See Rennard Strickland, Things Not Spoken: The Burial of Native American
History, Law and Culture, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 11 (2000) (discussing the disparity in
treatment of Native American and non-Native American graves and sacred objects). See
also Anthony Klesert & Shirley Powell, A Perspective on Ethics and the Reburial
Controversy, 58 AM. ANTIQuITY 348 (1993) (discussing the ethics in archaeology in taking
control over human remains).
178.
H.R. REP. No. 101-877, at 13 (1990) ("There was testimony that non-Indian
remains which are unearthed are treated much different than those of Indians. The nonIndian remains tend to be quickly studied and then reburied while so many Indian remains
are sent to museums and curated.").
179.
See McKeown & Hutt, supra note 1 !2, at 177-78.
180.
25 U.S.C. §§ 3002, 3005 (2000) (concerning determination of ownership upon
discovery and repatriation of human remains in collections). Note: NAGPRA does not
abrogate study, but rather allows for an initial determination of whether the act is applicable
and permits the tribe's signatory to the plan of action in the Intentional Excavation to agree
to the study. 25 U.S.C. §3002(c) (2000). In addition, the Repatriation section allows
studies "of major benefit to the United States" to continue upon application to the Secretary
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The application of NAGPRA to human remains has been under assault
by scientists, scholars and the courts. In Bonnichsen v. United States 8'
eight scientists 182 brought an action to assert a constitutional right to study
human remains' 83 found on lands under the administration of the U.S.
Corps of Engineers in 1996 and determined by the District Commander, in
compliance with NAGPRA, to be Native American remains subject to
disposition in favor of the claimant tribe, given the age of the remains, of
over 9,300 years.' 84 The plaintiffs did not request an ARPA permit 85 from
the Corps prior to proceeding to court on the basis that a right to study
trumped property rights and NAGPRA.186 The trial court found that the

of Interior. 25 U.S.C. § 3005(b) (2000).
181.
969 F. Supp. 628 (D. Or. 1997).
182.
There was a ninth scientist who took immediate custody of the remains as a
contractor for the coroner and who eventually requested and received an ARPA permit.
Bonnichsen, 969 F. Supp. at 631 n. 1. The court discussed the affidavit of the ninth scientist
and his tests on the human remains. Id. at 653 n.28. Later, the court also discussed his part
on the team that collected information and conducted an investigation to acquire some
knowledge. Bonnichsen v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1124 n.16 (D. Or. 2002).
Having been granted the access he sought, he could not be a plaintiff and was not required
to become a party when one of the bones was thought to be missing. The court discusses
this scientist in the opinion and, without a hearing, held the Corps responsible for the
missing bone and for jeopardizing the case. Id. at 1123. Later, when the bone was
discovered in a locker belonging to the ninth scientist, the court stated that it "now appears
to have been an innocent oversight." Id. at 1123 n. 12.
183.
See United States v. Austin, 902 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1990) (no constitutional
right to study). See also John A. Robertson, The Scientist's Right to Research: A
ConstitutionalAnalysis, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1206 (1978) (stating that scientists have
the right to study, but access to the materials for the study must come from willing sources).
But see Robert W. Lannan, Anthropology and Restless Spirits: The Native American
Graves Protection and RepatriationAct, 22 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 369 (1998) (arguing that
NAGPRA should be amended to allow scientific study on newly discovered remains
without regard to a property rights or civil rights analysis).
184.
Bonnichsen, 969 F. Supp. at 617-18. "'Native American' means of, or relating
to, a tribe, people, or culture that is indigenous to the United States." 25 U.S.C. § 3001(9)
(2000). Prior to NAGPRA most anthropologists would define "indigenous" as prior to
European contact.
185.
See 16 U.S.C. § 470cc (2000).
186.
The initial complaint requested "possession" of the remains and an "access to
study" as a matter of right and mentioned neither a request for an ARPA permit, nor the
agency responsibilities under NAGPRA. Bonnichsen v. United States, 357 F.3d 962 (9th
Cir. 2004) Plaintiffs attorney Alan L. Schneider announced to those at the Philadelphia
meeting of the Society for American Archaeology in March, 2001, that the First
Amendment right to study was so important that he would take the Bonnichsen case to the
Supreme Court if he were not successful at trial. The constitutional issues raised of a First
Amendment right to study and a "taking" of the rights of scientists by the Native American
claims to human remains were discussued in Jennifer R. Richman, NAGPRA:
ConstitutionallyAdequate?, in LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON CULTURAL RESOURCES 216,218-223
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plaintiffs had standing to make a claim for the remains, the tribe did not
have standing to enter the lawsuit as an interested party and that the court
would decide the terms of a judicial ARPA permit, having found that
remand under the Administrative Procedures Act 187 was inappropriate as
the Secretary of Interior, having substituted in the action for the Corps,
would likely consult with the five tribes making a joint claim for the
remains. 88 The court also found that it was incredible that the Secretary
could make a determination that the remains were culturally affiliated to a
present day tribe as the remains were so old. 189 The court held that it was
arbitrary and capricious to weigh the evidence of cultural affiliation in

(Richman & Forsyth eds. 2004). The trial court began to recognize such a right when the
court found that "Dr. Owsley has repeatedly requested access to the skeleton for additional
analysis.... He and all other members of the scientific community have been denied direct
access because of the district's commitment to the tribal coalition." Bonnichsen, 969 F.
Supp. at 635. The court did not note in what manner requests were made, although there
was never a dispute that the plaintiffs never requested an ARPA permit. The court found
that the scientist plaintiffs had standing to receive the remains, as did the Asatru plaintiffsan unspecified religious order. Id. at 635-37. The court further noted that the First
Amendment may apply as "[t]he skeletal remains are analogous to a book that they can
read.... Plaintiffs simply want the government to step aside and permit them to 'read that
book' by conducting their own tests." Id. at 646.
187.
5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
188.
Bonnichsen, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 1126-30. See Letter from Bruce Babitt,
Secretary of the Interior, to Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army (Sept. 25, 2000) available
at http://www.cr.nps.gov/aad/kennewick/babbletter.htm (giving a complete analysis of the
NAGPRA process relative to the case and an evaluation of all of the information from
scientists and tribal people considered in coming to the decision).
189.
Bonnichsen, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 1138. See JEANETrE GREENNFIELD, THE
RETURN OF CULTURAL TREASURES (Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1995). The author is an

anthropologist who points out that the same argument was offered by the British Museum in
support of its desire to maintain the Elgin marbles, that is, that the ancient Greeks have no
relationship to modem day Greeks and therefore the property is that of the world society.
She finds such an argument "startling" to scientists as it denies "the legitimacy of any
cultural continuity." Id. at 71. In Bonnichsen, the court required the government to show a
political tribal membership in common between the claimants and the remains, that the
remains found had a discrete affiliation present in an existing tribe, and required proof of a
membership in a common identified tribal group, rather than a cultural relationship, as
stated in the law. Bonnichsen, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 1136, 1138, 1156. Thus, the court was
fixated upon membership in a tribe as recognized by the United States, rather than upon
"closest cultural affiliation," as was settled upon by Congress. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a)(2)(B)
(2000). In NAGPRA the recognition of a tribe is a factor in having standing to make a
claim for the remains, as the federal government recognizes tribes on a government-togovernment basis. 25 U.S.C. § 3010 (2000). The distinction between standing to be given
property under NAGPRA and standing to question arbitrary and capricious conduct of the
government was not made by the court. See Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871
(1990); Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000) (giving a basis for review of
a final decision of a government agency).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24

favor of the tribes given that the scientists had scientific hypotheses that
included that the remains were not of a person indigenous to the United
States.' 90 While the court went on at length on the fine qualifications of the
plaintiffs as scientists and the inability of the government to prove with
certainty the political affiliation of the remains, 9' the court did not address
the Congressional decision not to put an age limit on ownership
determinations of human remains. Assuming cultural affiliation did not
apply to the decision in this instance, or could not be substantiated, the
court did not address how it could disregard the ownership determination of
the Secretary of the Interior based upon aboriginal territory, required in the
law when cultural affiliation cannot be determined. 92 The court did not
find that there is a right to study for scientists, although scholars continue
to assert 93
that when it comes to Native American items, the right to study
prevails.

On February 4, 2004, the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion upholding
the trial court in all respects. 94 In reaching its decision, the court judicially
amended the law. NAGPRA requires a two-step process when remains are
found on federal land. First, determine in the first instance whether the
remains are Native American. 195 Second, determine the disposition of the
remains according to the following priorities: (1) to descendants if
known; 96 (2) if descendants are not known, then to the tribal land owner, if
the remains are on tribal land, and if the remains are on federal land, then to
the tribe having the "closest cultural affiliation"; 197 or (3) "if the cultural
affiliation of the objects cannot be reasonably ascertained," then "in the
Indian tribe that is recognized as aboriginally occupying the area in which
the objects were discovered," unless another tribe can show a "stronger
cultural relationship."'' 98 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit established a two
step process, requiring that first, to determine applicability of the law, the

190.
Bonnichsen v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1143 (D. Or. 2002).
191.
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"remains have a significant relationship to a presently existing 'tribe,
people or culture."' 99 Second, the court "requires a more specific finding
that remains are most closely affiliated to specific lineal descendants or to a
specific Indian tribe." 2°° In so doing, the court collapsed the NAGPRA
first step with part of the second step, refused to recognize that a claim
based on aboriginal territory exists in the law and raised the bar to tribal
claims for disposition by inserting that a "significant" relationship be
shown rather than a "reasonably ascertained" affiliation. 20 The decision
also disallows claims by joint claimants having historical affiliation to the
remains. While the Ninth Circuit discussed the noble purpose of the law,
the court was incredulous that Congress would have intended the law to
apply to all indigenous remains.2 °2
If Geronimo was an air traveler involved in a fatal accident, no doubt
he would prefer his remains to be handled under the procedures of the
NTSB rather than under the process established in Bonnichsen. The Ninth
Circuit decision reveals the deep-seated
assumption that Native Americans
20 3
have no authority over their past.
VII. GERONIMO: CAPTIVE IN LIFE, SOVEREIGN IN DEATH
Although during his life Geronimo was vilified and pictured as a
savage killer, "he gradually came to symbolize the brave fight of a brave
people for independence and ownership of their homeland. ' '2 0 4 A
biographer of Geronimo wrote in 1909 that,
I venture to prophesy that as time passes and all the
obtainable material is collected and properly compiled,
leaving us at a point sufficiently remote and high from
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contradictory statements or facts distorted because of the
lack of sufficient detail; that, when we shall be able to look
back upon this Indian war chief with a historical
perspective, we will decide that he was one of the greatest
"Americans" that ever lived.2 °5
However, the glory that was visited on Geronimo as an icon of a spirit
of leadership and independence has somehow been disassociated with the
fact that he was also a member of a family and community that is Apache.
Almost ninety years after his death, a case was brought in federal district
court for the "repatriation" of the remains of Geronimo to a man and a
group having no association with any band of Apaches. 2° Michael Idrogo
and the Americans for Repatriation of Geronimo sought to have the Army
release the remains of Geronimo to them for removal from Fort Sill to an
unnamed location in Arizona or New Mexico.2 °7 The plaintiffs predicated
the claim upon NAGPRA and asserted that Idrogo, as a Spanish speaker
like Geronimo and being about the same height as the deceased, is a distant
relative. °8
In dismissing the claims of Idrogo and the Americans for Repatriation
of Geronimo, the court succinctly held that mere belief of a relationship is
insufficient to bring a claim. 209 Further the court found that, as neither
Idrogo, nor the other plaintiffs, had any ties to any Indian tribe, they lacked
standing upon which to bring a claim for the remains of Geronimo under
NAGPRA, or any other grounds recognized in the courts of the United
States. 210 The brevity with which the court dismissed the claims of nonIndians for control over Native American human remains was profound as
a statement that recognized Native American cultural property rights.
The questions of whether the exhumation of Geronimo would produce
a complete set of human remains, and whether the location of the skull at
Yale is a grandiose myth or a carefully guarded reality, have returned to the
attention of the press, as both President George W. Bush and a contender 21
to
unseat him, John Kerry, are members of the Skull and Bones society. 1
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NAGPRA does not apply to private organizations, such as the Skull and
Bones, and there are no living members of the group that would have
perpetrated the alleged theft, but the San Carlos Apache are interested in
resolving the matter.212 It is possible that at some point a court will be
asked to grant an exhumation order.2 3 If such a request is made, hopefully
the court will decide the matter by deferring to the descendents of
Geronimo and thus grant equal protection of the law to Native Americans.
It has been surmised that the late twentieth century recognition of
Native American culture and the recent respect for cultural property rights
of Native Americans, as expressed in law, if not in fact, is a new tolerance
of diversity that may reflect less of a fear of Indians, having finally won the
Indian wars, than the majority culture seeing in Native Americans a
religious faith and sense of identity that is to be admired.21 4 If to be
civilized means that a sense of cultural identity and preserving that identity
is admirable, then much is to be learned from the noble savage who has
persevered despite all attempts at assimilation. Equal protection for Native
American cultural property exists in the law and should be part of the ethic
with which the law is applied.
In life, Geronimo was a pawn of those in the Tucson, Arizona
business community, who sought to profit from his demise, and a captive
of the United States Army. In death, Geronimo has been accorded the
respect given to deceased members of the dominant culture and his tribe
recognized as the guardians its people. It is important to note that in
coming to the decision in Idrogo, the court did not devise or rely upon any
special law for the treatment of Indians. Rather, the court simply relied
upon the constitutional concept of equal protection under the common law,
as the court considered the rights of the plaintiffs and of those who may
have a lawful interest in the deceased. The simplicity of the logic of the
court belies the beleaguered path of Native Americans in coming to this
point in history.
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1 5 If so, as
Historians have described Geronimo as a reluctant warrior.
he sought to live in peace, so may he rest in peace.
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